

























































































































1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
ＧＤＰデフレーター －0.6 －1.7 －2.0 －1.3 －1.7
鉱工業生産指数 －7.0 3.3 4.0 －10.2 －1.3
個人消費支出1) －0.8 －1.9 －1.1 －2.6 －1.3
平均消費性向1） 71.1 71.7 72.5 71.4 73.9


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Effect of the Inflation-targeting
Policy on the Real Economy:
A Historical Examination
Atsushi ICHINOSE
This paper, depending mainly on historical data, argues that the so-called in-
flation-targeting policy (ITP) will not bring about inflation (or a recovery of the
real economy).
In section 1 we argue that though the quantitative monetary easing policy
starting in March 2001 contains, to a considerable degree, elements of ITP,
deflationary trends in the real economy have not been reversed at all.
In section 2 we divide the logical processes of ITP into two stages and argue
that neither will stand up to examination.
The first stage: Supporters of ITP insist that if the government and the Bank
declare jointly a clear numerical inflation rate target, the expected real interest
rate on lending will be lowered, so that investments in real goods and services
will increase. But unless the markets are convinced that the Bank will be able to
bring about inflation through one or another concrete means, inflation will not be
realized.
Indeed an implicit form of ITP was adopted during the periods of the so-called
excess-liquidity inflation in 197374 and the so-called asset-inflation (the
Bubble) in the latter half of 1980’ s. But in these two cases it was not monetary
easing policy that brought about the initial inflation. Historical facts show that
both the real economy and the stock market were recovering before the start of
monetary easing, and that the monetary relaxation only amplified the degree of
inflation. Also in the case of the current monetary easing (since July 1991), mar-
kets very well understand that the Bank hopes to generate a mild form of infla-
tion. Still, bank lending has not been increased because markets have not been
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convinced that the Bank has devised an effective means to generate
inflation(＝recovery of the real economy).
The second stage: Supporters of ITP insist that investments in real goods and
services will increase if the expected real rate of interest is lowered. But as far
as our examination of the historical facts since 1970 is concerned, we cannot help
but point to a positive correlation between real interest rates and the volume of
bank lending; when real interest rate rises, investments in real goods and serv-
ices increase, and vice versa. In short, it is not certain at all that lowering of the
real interest rate on lending will give rise to an increase of investments in real
goods and services. What is important is that recovery of the real economy must
precede monetary relaxation.
The logical structure of ITP is fragile in the light of historical examination.
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